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To	Brussels	via	Rome:	how	Eurosceptical	are	British
Christians?
Catholics	tend	to	have	a	more	positive	view	of	the	EU	than	other	Christians,
write	Ekaterina	Kolpinskaya	(Swansea	University)	and	Stuart	Fox
(Cardiff	University),	who	have	analysed	Euroscepticism	among	different
denominations.	The	religious	are	more	likely	to	be	Eurosceptic,	with
members	of	the	Church	of	England	and	Presbyterians	especially	so.	The
authors	attribute	these	differences	to	a	deep-rooted	suspicion	of
supranational	institutions	among	Anglicans,	as	well	as	the	Roman	Catholic
identification	with	the	Papacy	as	a	cross-national	institution	that	constraints	national	sovereignty,	but	in	which	all
share	a	commitment	to	common	values	and	goals.
Religious	beliefs	and	affiliation	have	long	been	assumed	to	play	a	minor	role	in	explaining	Euroscepticism,
including	support	for	Brexit	in	the	EU	referendum.	Whether	someone	is	religious	or	non-religious,	as	well	as
whether	they	are	a	member	of	a	particular	religious	group,	has	a	direct	and	significant	effect	on	their	support	for
EU	membership	and	shapes	attitudes	that	themselves	influence	Euroscepticism.
The	magnitude	of	these	effects	is	smaller	than	that	of	traits	more	commonly	associated	with	Euroscepticism	such
as	education,	age	or	social	class.	Nonetheless,	they	offer	new	insight	into	how	public	support	for	EU	membership
and	integration	is	shaped	by	the	shared	history,	identity	and	values	of	different	religious	groups.
A	pan-European	church	…	a	priest	of	the	Santa	Maria	sopra	Minerva	church	in	Rome	attends
the	funeral	mass	of	Cardinal	Cormac	Murphy	O’Connor,	September	2017.	Photo:	Catholic
Church	England	&	Wales	via	a	CC-BY-NC-SA	2.0	licence
When	we	look	deeper	into	the	relationships	between	religious	affiliation	and	different	dimensions	of
Euroscepticism,	namely	support	for	the	utilitarian	case	(essentially	based	on	a	cost-benefit	analysis	of	the	EU
membership)	and	affective	case	(the	level	of	emotional	attachment	to	European	institutions),	we	find	stark
differences	in	support	between	believers	and	others.	We	examined	these	relationships	using	the	British	Election
Study	Referendum	Panel,	which	provides	enough	respondents	from	a	range	of	Christian	denominations	to
sustain	reliable	analyses	of	differences	between	them.
We	found
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religious	affiliation	has	a	small	but	notable	effect	on	Euroscepticism,	even	after	other	determinants	of
support	have	been	accounted	for;
being	affiliated	to	a	specific	religious	group	influences	people’s	support	for	(or	hostility	towards)	EU
membership	by	shaping	their	assessments	of	the	costs	and	benefits	of	EU	membership,	the	performance	of
the	EU	in	achieving	policy	objectives,	and	their	affective	attachment	to	the	institution.
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Source:	BES,	Wave	7-9.	Note:	Circles	indicate	random-effects	GLS	regression	coefficients,	and	bars	around	them	indicate
standard	errors.	If	a	bar	crosses	the	line	through	zero	the	effect	is	not	statistically	significant	at	95%	confidence	level.	“No
religion”	is	a	reference	group.
There	are	significant	differences	in	Euroscepticism	among	the	various	Christian	denominations.	The	most	Brexit-
supporting	groups	are	members	of	the	Church	of	England	and	Presbyterians,	while	Catholics	are	typically	the
most	supportive	of	EU	membership.	Other	Protestant	groups	(Baptists	and	Methodists)	sit	somewhere	in
between.	These	findings	closely	resemble	the	relationships	between	religious	belief	and	Euroscepticism	identified
in	other	European	countries.
For	the	most	part,	this	is	a	result	of	Catholics’	greater	propensity	to	assess	the	EU’s	policy	performance	and	the
benefits	of	EU	membership	positively,	and	to	identify	with	the	Union	and	perceive	it	as	a	legitimate	institution.
This	trait	probably	stems	from	the	history	of	Catholicism,	which	values	international	co-operation	within	a
supranational	institution	–	i.e.	the	Papacy	–	that	constrains	the	sovereignty	of	national	governments,	as	well	as
from	the	belief	in	universal	social,	moral	and	political	values	and	a	tendency	to	view	universalism	as	the	means	by
which	shared	goals	and	objectives	can	be	achieved.
Anglicans,	conversely,	are	more	likely	to	feel	that	the	costs	of	EU	membership	are	greater	than	the	benefits	and
to	reject	a	European	identity.	This	is	probably	a	reflection	of	their	attachment	to	the	notion	of	a	sovereign,
independent	nation-state,	and	historic	scepticism	regarding	supranational	institutions	promoting	universalist
values	and	threatening	their	own	distinctive	identity.	Moreover,	the	history	of	Protestantism	is	one	in	which	the
various	groups	have	been	dependent	upon	a	strong	nation	state	and	national	government	to	protect	them	from
the	dominance	of	a	supra-national	institution	promoting	Catholic	universalism;	and	the	values	of	Protestantism
promote	localised	collectivism	based	around	common	local	and/or	national	identities	to	achieve	common
objectives,	rather	than	unification	with	a	supranational	institution.	It	seems	likely	that	the	history	and	values	of
Protestantism	predispose	its	affiliates	towards	more	negative	views	of	the	EU’s	policy	performance	and	weaker
attachments	to	it,	and	to	the	notion	of	a	European	citizenry,	than	their	Catholic	counterparts.
The	differences	in	attitudes	towards	the	EU,	and	support	for	it,	were	also	reflected	in	slight	differences	in	voter
choice	patterns	between	members	of	different	religious	denomination	in	the	2016	referendum.	Protestant	groups,
and	particularly	those	with	a	historically	close	relationship	with	the	UK	national	government	and	who	consider
themselves	integral	to	the	preservation	of	British	(or	English)	national	identity	(such	as	the	Church	of	England),
were	more	likely	than	Catholics	and	those	of	no	religious	affiliation	to	vote	for	Brexit.	Catholics	were	slightly	more
likely	to	vote	for	Brexit	than	those	with	no	affiliation,	but	were	nonetheless	typically	more	pro-EU	than	the
Protestants.	Some	of	these	differences	remain	substantial	and	statistically	significant	even	after	a	wide	range	of
controls	for	individual-level	determinants	of	Euroscepticism	are	included	in	the	model.	This	confirms	that	while
religious	affiliation	may	not	have	had	a	particularly	strong	impact	on	one’s	propensity	to	support	Brexit	during	the
referendum	–	compared	with	age	or	social	class,	for	example	–	it	was	nonetheless	a	significant	one.
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	authors	and	not	those	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	the	LSE.
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